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1 Introduction: South Africa’s changing MEC 
 
The South African economy, along with the global economy more generally, has 
become increasingly financialized since the early 1990s. Financialization is closely 
associated with neoliberal policies which have included the active promotion of 
financial sector interests and a changing role for the state, particularly through its 
withdrawal from direct ownership (through privatization) and from social provision. 
Financial markets and financial institutions have grown in both size and influence 
over the neoliberal period. Financialization is understood as changes in the structure 
and processes of capitalist accumulation. This has entailed important shifts in the 
relations between households, corporate business, and financial institutions. This shift 
has been from a situation where financial institutions have acted as intermediaries 
between household savers and investing firms towards a financial system that creates 
liquid markets where household investors can freely buy and sell claims on corporate 
earnings. Financialized financial institutions as issuers and dealers of financial paper 
are thus regulators of firm and household behavior and of the macroeconomic 
trajectory rather than unproblematic intermediaries between saving households and 
non-financial corporate businesses, or between banks and corporate businesses or 
between firms. (Froud et. al. 2002) 
 
How does corporate (financial and non-financial) and household behavior change 
after financialization? What are the consequences of these changes? To answer these 
questions we need to be aware of how financialization has affected different countries 
in specific ways, through the interaction between a variety of what we call channels of 
financialization. To understand financialization in the context of South African 
capitalism, we use Fine and Rustomjee’s (1996) conception of the South African 
economy as having evolved a distinctive system of accumulation which they call the  
‘minerals-energy complex’ (MEC). We argue that we have moved from a period of 
the classic MEC to a now financialized MEC (Ashman 2012). Fine and Rustomjee 
provide a framework for understanding the historical development of the structure of 
the economy through examining the evolution of big business (both English and 
Afrikaner) and the state. The term MEC summarizes the way in which this 
agglomeration of corporate and state interests supported the development of mining, 
minerals processing and energy related economic sectors and neglected other sectors 
with weak linkages to the MEC “core”. The expansion of one sector in the MEC has a 
pulling effect on other MEC sectors but this occurs in relative isolation from non-
MEC sectors and for this reason the economy has skewed and relatively undiversified 
industrial structure.
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 While this paper cannot delve deeply into the economic history of South Africa it acknowledges the 
importance of the country’s political and economic history. Land alienation, forceful proletarianization, 
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The conglomerate corporations around mining, energy and finance and the larger state 
owned enterprises came to dominate the entire South African economy by the 1980s. 
The term MEC thus denotes an economy concentrated in particular sectors and sub 
sectors but also marked by high concentrations of ownership. The high level of 
concentration in the South African economy has not changed as a result of the 
extensive and significant corporate restructuring since the 1990s (Roberts et al, 2003, 
Competition Commission, 2009). In South Africa, most sectors remain dominated by 
one or two firms that are often highly vertically integrated. From the 1990s the South 
African economy’s growth path has been shaped by financialization, which has 
directed capital away from the investment necessary to diversify the industrial base.  
 
The liberalization of domestic financial markets has contributed to financialization of 
the South African economy. This deregulation occurred within the context of 
widespread global deregulation of financial markets and cross-border financial flows. 
To a large extent the South African financial institutions have emulated the behaviour 
of US and British finance, which given their longstanding ties, were the benchmarks 
for South African financial institutions. Similar to the US and Britain, South Africa 
has developed a market-centred rather than a bank-centred financial system.
2
 The 
rapid growth and increasing rates of return of these Western financial institutions 
were seen as a sign of their success and further supported their emulation in South 
Africa. 
 
Financialization has reshaped the South African economic growth path over the past 
two decades as capital was directed to finance and consumption and the sectors with 
strong linkages to these activities (Ashman et al, 2010; Mohamed, 2010). This 
economic growth path is not sustainable as its limits are linked to the size of bubbles 
that can be created in real estate and financial asset markets and the extent to which 
debt can be extended for consumption. The global financial crisis very quickly 
provided these constraints for South Africa in 2008. Mohamed and Finnoff (2005) 
argue that the weaknesses of an economy shaped by the MEC and the political 
changes in South Africa led to large-scale capital flight from the South African 
economy after the onset of democracy.  The macroeconomic policies of the country 
and the type of liberalization of exchange controls allowed big business to take large 
amounts of capital abroad (Ashman, Fine and Newman (2011). The economy became 
more dependent on short-term capital inflows to maintain the overall balance of 
payments. 
 
We argue that the gap between gross savings and gross capital formation has widened 
since 1994 because an increasing share of savings was channelled towards financial 
investment and the shifting patterns of investment by non-financial corporations. 
Contrary to the view that South Africans do not save enough we show that gross 
domestic savings has stagnated since 2002 with an increase in gross savings being 
driven by capital inflows from the rest of the world attracted by high interest rates 
healthy returns on South African capital markets. Low domestic savings is due to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and the legacy of colonialism and apartheid in general, can be felt on class formation, the nature of the 
state, business, labour markets, and many other aspects of post-apartheid society and economy. 
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 See Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Ross Levine (eds) Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-
Country Comparison of Banks, Markets and Development, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004 for a 
discussion of bank-centred and market-centred financial systems. 
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poverty and inequality. The financial sector attracts short-term and speculative rather 
than long-term productive capital. These short-term inflows finance a large current 
account deficit and maintain the overall balance of payments, but this is at the expense 
of productive investment and employment creation. 
 
In what follows, Section 2 looks at financialization in general terms; Section 3 
provides evidence of financialisation in South Africa at three different levels 
identified – financial institutions; non-financial corporations, and households. 
Section 4 looks at corporate restructuring and the financialization of NFCs in SA, 
arguing that they have selectively withdrawn from certain business activities in South 
Africa and have further tightened their grip in South Africa. The restructuring of the 
South African corporate landscape during the 1990s has increased South Africa’s 
dependence on mining and minerals resources while strengthening the financial sector 
but left manufacturing industry weakened. Section 5 the effect of these changes on 
labour and employment. It gives a context that describes the reform of labour 
legislation from 1994 and discusses the defensive response by big business to these 
changes. Overall, it argues that the impact of corporate restructuring and 
financialization on employment has been negative and the changes have led to 
increasingly precarious employment in non-productive services. There has been lower 
productivity as a result not of poor training and skills but because of poor pay, 
casualisation and outsourcing, less training and increasing unemployment. Section 6 
is the conclusion. 
Financialization: theory and literature 
The term financialization has its origins in heterodox political economy in the last 
decade or so and it points to important changes in the nature of capital accumulation. 
Ashman and Fine (2013) provide a summary of what financialization has involved in 
the following terms: 
the phenomenal expansion of financial assets relative to real activity (by three 
times over the last thirty years); the proliferation of types of assets, from 
derivatives through to futures markets with a corresponding explosion of 
acronyms; the absolute and relative expansion of speculative as opposed to or 
at the expense of real investment; a shift in the balance of productive to 
financial imperatives within the private sector whether financial or not; 
increasing inequality in income arising out of weight of financial rewards; 
consumer-led booms based on credit; the penetration of finance into ever more 
areas of economic and social life such as pensions, education, health, and 
provision of economic and social infrastructure; the emergence of a neo-liberal 
culture of reliance upon markets and private capital and corresponding anti-
statism despite the extent to which the rewards to private finance have in part 
derived from state finance itself. Financialization is also associated with the 
continued role of the US dollar as world money despite, at least in the global 
crisis of the noughties, its deficits in trade, capital account, the fiscus, and 
consumer spending, and minimal rates of interest.  
One critical consequence of financialization has been to reduce the level and efficacy 
of real investment as financial instruments and activities have expanded at its expense 
– albeit with booms in investment in particular sectors at particular times such as with 
the dotcom bubble of the 1990s. Overall, financialization has produced the 
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prioritization of shareholder value – or financial worth – over other economic and 
social values and extended the influence of finance over economic and social policy 
more generally, both directly and indirectly. More and more aspects of economic and 
social life become put at risk from the volatility of financial instability as a 
consequence (Ashman, Fine and Newman 2010; Ashman and Fine 2013). Most 
research, particularly initially, focused on the USA and the UK as the leading 
examples of financialized economies. But as financialization has extended, it can be 
seen to have a wide variety of forms and effects in different national contexts. 
The literature on financialization in the US suggests that important changes in the 
global economy are the result of the way that new entrants - the “Asian Tigers” and 
then China and India – have increased competition in global product markets. This 
had the effect of driving down prices and reducing profits for US manufacturing 
firms. This did not, however, lead to the scaling down of production given the 
existence of high levels of sunk costs and increasing returns to scale. Instead it 
produced a shift from the funding of new investment from retained corporate earnings 
to external sources of finance (Crotty 2002). The 1980s and 1990s saw a growth in the 
influence of financial actors, particularly institutional investors. The 1980s also saw a 
rise in mergers and acquisitions and of hostile takeovers. By the 1990s, there was 
broad agreement across business, government and academia that management 
priorities had shifted to a focus on the need to increase shareholder value. Managers 
of non-financial corporations thus found that they had to focus on increasing short-
term returns rather than the long-run growth of business. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(2000) have characterized this as a shift from ‘patient’ to ‘impatient’ capital. Whereas 
during the ‘patient capital’  of the post-WWII period management was focused on 
accumulation through ‘retain and reinvest’, from the 1980s onwards management 
were pressured to focus on short-term returns and had to ‘downsize and distribute’.  
 
Crotty (2002) argues that the interests of the executives of corporations were aligned 
with the short-term interests of institutional investors through increased use of share 
options. A larger share of executive remuneration came from share options and profit-
linked performance bonuses which concentrated their attention on achieving high 
short-term returns. Froud et al (2003) describe the impact of financialization causing a 
change in US management’s attitudes from that of a concern during the 1980s with 
competing against Japanese corporations for shares of product markets to worrying 
about pressure from the stock market during the 1990s. Both Crotty (2002) and Froud 
et al (2003) point to how corporations began to face both increased competition in 
product markets and pressure from financial markets to report ever increasing levels 
of profits. Crotty (2002) refers to this as the ‘neo-liberal paradox’. He ascribes high 
levels of corporate fraud and misreporting of profits during the early 2000s as one 
response by executives to this pressure. Attacks on working conditions are another 
response of executives to this pressure. Crotty argues that the ‘high road labour 
relations’ of the post-WWII era were eroded by management when corporate profits 
in the US began to decline. This erosion of wages, benefits and standards spread 
globally; possibly contributing to declines in global economic growth and aggregate 
demand from the 1980s.  
 
Froud et al (2003) provide in-depth case studies of financialized multinational 
corporations and argue that there is a discrepancy between the ‘narratives’ and 
‘numbers’ of these corporations. The public narratives provided by chief executive 
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officers and other executives of these corporations are designed to bolster and 
improve share prices by creating ‘stories’ about the performance and future plans of 
the corporation which are not confirmed by the financial results of these corporations 
in reality. The phenomenon they speak about has created a business environment 
where certain CEOs have ‘superstar status’ and the performance of share prices reflect 
the CEOs public performances rather than the actual activities and profits of their 
corporations. Such corporate superstars include (now deceased) Steve Jobs of Apple, 
Richard Branson of Virgin, and former CEO of GE Jack Welch. Froud et al (2003) 
also show how non-financial corporations resorted to financial activities and 
speculation in financial markets to increase their returns to shareholders. For example, 
Froud et al (2003) show that high returns to GE shareholders were not attained by 
gains in product markets but by activities in financial markets – whatever 
shareholders believed about Jack Welch. In reality, GE acquired financial firms with 
high returns which increased the average return of the GE Group. 
 
Another phenomenon that increased with the onset of the financialization of NFCs 
was share buybacks. Share buybacks were an easy way for firms to increase earnings 
per share and push up share prices. Crotty (2002) and Orhangazi (2007) argue that 
many NFCs in the US increased their levels of debt in order to buy back shares. Share 
buybacks that increased share prices were not only a means for executives to get 
higher bonuses and appreciation from shareholders; it was also a means to respond to 
the possibility of hostile takeovers. Increased criticism of management could lead to 
attempts by certain institutional investors to replace management or embark on a 
hostile takeover. The reduction of shares available in secondary markets was a way 
for executives to increase their power in these conflicts. 
 
Stout (2012:3) in a detailed study of shareholder value within US corporate law says, 
“… it is just that – an ideology, not a legal requirement or a practical necessity of 
modern business life. United States corporate law does not, and never has, required 
directors of public corporations to maximise either share price or shareholders 
wealth.” As long as the boards of these corporations do not use their positions to 
unduly enrich themselves, US law gives them much discretion in how they run their 
businesses. Boards do not have to be fixated on increasing shareholder value but 
could pursue goals such as firm growth, improving the quality of their products, 
protecting employees and serving the public interest. Stout argues that the single-
minded goal of pursuing increased shareholder value is harmful to both corporations 
and US society:  
 
In the quest to “unlock shareholder value’ they sell key assets, fire loyal employees, and 
ruthlessly squeeze the workforce that remains; cut back on product support, customer assistance, 
and research and development; delay replacing outworn, outmoded, and unsafe equipment; 
shower CEOs with stock options, and expensive pay packages to ‘incentivize” them; drain cash 
reserves to pay large dividends and repurchase company shares, leveraging firms until they teeter 
on the brink of insolvency; and lobby regulators and Congress to change the law so that they can 
chase short-term profits speculating in credit default swaps and other high risk financial 
derivatives. (Stout 2012:4) 
 
Crotty (2002) also argues that financialization also means that subsidiary firms are 
often not seen as enterprises to nurture and grow over the long-term within corporate 
groups but instead are seen as part of a portfolio of assets to be bought and sold to 
increase the short-term returns of the corporation. Froud et al (2003) argue that 
downsizing was a common response by executives to pressure for higher returns. Both 
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behaviours, treating subsidiary firms as part of a portfolio of assets and downsizing 
firms, reduce investment in long-term productive capacity and building the skills of 
the workforce. They are also associated with increased offshoring and outsourcing of 
(increasingly) core business activities. As a narrative instrument, talk about 
downsizing by executives seemed to guarantee higher share prices. For example, 
downsizing of a corporation’s labour force usually sends a signal to those speculating 
in the stock market that management is cutting costs to increase profits. The downside 
could be that those corporations would lose skills in their workforces that they had 
built up over a long time. Put differently, they may be harming the long-term 
productivity growth of the firms within their corporation for short-term gains in their 
share price.  
 
The experience of Europe, particularly the UK during the 1980s, provides important 
insight into the negative impacts of downsizing and downgrading labour market 
conditions on economies. Michie and Wilkinson (1994) discuss labour markets during 
the de-industrialization period during 1980s. They argue that the process of 
downsizing, casualization and outsourcing undervalues lower skilled and semi-skilled 
jobs. They attribute loss of manufacturing sector jobs and de-industrialization not to 
shifts in consumption patterns favouring increased growth in services but to a shift in 
the balance of trade and growing overall levels of manufacturing. They show that in 
the UK, where de-industrialization and manufacturing job losses were highest, that 
manufacturing job loss was due to a situation where there was productivity growth but 
not growth in manufacturing output. The tight monetary policy pursued at the time 
further increased unemployment. Yet the policy response to unemployment caused by 
tight monetary policy and the trade imbalance (balance of payments constraints) in the 
UK was labour market deregulation which lowered pay, increased inequality, and 
contributed to labour force instability which in turn is a large constraint on training. 
The overall experience in the UK (as elsewhere) was that employers that could take 
advantage of high unemployment levels chose to reduce work conditions, cut pay and 
casualized jobs. The causation within orthodox economics is therefore incorrect when 
it is argued that low productivity causes low wages or that lack of training and skills is 
the cause of low pay. Low paying employers are less likely to train their employees. 
Low pay also allows firms to survive even where there is poor performance from 
management and obsolete equipment is not replaced. Declining training capacity can 
also lead to a skills shortage. 
 
Perhaps most important for South Africa is the impact of financialization on levels of 
investment, something discussed further in the next section. Aglietta and Breton 
(2001) argue that as nonfinancial corporations seek to increase their dividend 
payments and to use share buybacks to raise share prices they are left with less capital 
for investment. Dumenil and Levy (2004) show that interest and dividend payments 
from nonfinancial corporations to financial markets have increased and that as a 
consequence nonfinancial corporations have less capital for productive investment. 
Orhangazi (2007), discussed further below, uses firm level data from the US to show 
a negative relationship between real investment and financialization. Lapavitsas 
(2012) argues we need to look further at the development of financial imperatives in 
three separate but connected spheres banks/financial institutions, firms and 
households (see section 3 below for evidence from South Africa from these three 
different areas) and how these combine to particular form and effect. But in general 
terms global deregulation and deregulation in South Africa have contributed to the 
7 
 
7 
 
growth of the financial sector and the increasing influence of finance over other 
spheres of South African society at the same time as these changes have had an 
impact on non-financial corporations and upon households.  
 
In conclusion, the financialization of the US and other developed economies has had a 
number of negative outcomes for the global economy and the South African economy. 
The impact on corporations has been a shift towards focus on short-term returns and 
increased concern with shareholder value. This development has been negative for 
investment and employment. Further, the negative relationship between management 
and workers associated with lower investment in enterprises is associated with lower 
employment, lower levels of productivity and training and increased outsourcing and 
casualisation of jobs. The overall results of financialization are lower employment, 
reduced skills levels, increased inequality, and higher levels of poverty. The lower 
levels of investment and employment lead to lower levels of aggregate demand. 
2.2 Mining and financialization and changes to commodity markets 
 
The importance of mining to the South African economy means we need to look 
specifically at the financialization of the global mining industry and global 
commodities markets and the implications of this for South Africa. There are negative 
consequences associated with financial crises and contagion and the possibility of 
even more destabilizing bubbles and crashes. The environment leads to increased 
uncertainty and more difficulty for planning investment and increasing employment in 
mining. Changes to commodity markets have occurred as a result of new financial 
institutions and instruments, particularly the use of derivatives linked to commodities 
and the proliferation of exchange traded funds (ETFs) including those tracking 
commodities stocks. The use of derivatives has not significantly declined as a result of 
the global financial crisis. According to the BIS statistical release for 2012, the total 
notional amounts outstanding for over the counter derivatives returned to over 
US$600 trillion during 2011 but had not significantly declined below US$600 trillion 
during the crisis (BIS 2013). There have been large investment flows into 
commodities derivatives over the past decade and these flows increased after the 
global crisis. Thus, while mining concerns such as Anglo American report what seems 
to be legitimate use of derivatives to hedge risks in currency, commodities and 
interest rates, the commodities market themselves have become the focus of 
speculative activity.
3
 
 
The European Union has expressed concern with the changes in mining and 
commodity markets. A statement released on discussion within the Council of the 
European Union: 
 
Acknowledges that financial markets have a role in hedging the exposure of both 
producers and consumers of raw materials and commodities to risks associated with 
physical production and price uncertainty, whilst also TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the 
growing influence of financial actors in commodity markets, in particular the steep rise in 
financial investment flows into commodity derivative markets in recent years, and 
                                                          
3
 It seems that the mining corporations have become more reliant on conventional funding sources at 
a time when derivatives have become more important in price formation for their products. The 
reliance on conventional funding has meant that since the global economic crisis mining companies 
have not invested as much in new mines but have expanded existing mines. 
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believes this trend should be analysed with a view to its potential to affect the proper 
functioning of commodity markets; AGREES that the integrity and transparency of 
commodity derivatives markets need to be improved. (Council of the European Union, 
2011) 
 
The growth of exchange traded funds (ETFs, also referred to as tracker funds) is due 
to the overall financialization of markets that have affected the way in which retail 
investment firms market investment services and how investment companies and 
institutional investors choose to allocate their investments. The portfolio choices of 
investors favour increasingly liquid investments and diversification. ETFs have grown 
very fast. According to a BIS working paper, the ETF market had grown to over $1.6 
trillion in 2010 from $410b in 2005 (Ramaswamy 2011). The Financial Stability 
Board estimates that the ETF market has grown at an annual rate of 40% over the past 
decade (see Gillian Tett, 5 May 2011 Financial Times). Ramaswamy says that 80% of 
ETF assets in Europe are owned by institutional investor and 50% are owned by 
institutional investors in the US. Ramaswamy warns that the ETFs are not transparent 
in the way they track indexes. He says that as ETFs have proliferated and competition 
has increased the complexity of the ETFs has increased. These developments have 
made risk assessment difficult. Many of the risks that emerged in the rapid growth of 
the securitized debt and derivatives markets before the global financial crisis could 
very well be present in the very rapidly growing ETF market. 
 
There are vanilla ETFs that hold the actual financial assets of the indexes they track 
and there are synthetic ETFs that include derivatives based on the value of the 
financial assets in the index they are tracking. The use of derivatives poses dangers 
related to over-leveraging. The Financial Stability Board has also warned that 
investors in ETFs may not be aware of the risks associated with what they are buying 
(Tett  2011). A similar problem was encountered with derivatives and securitized debt 
markets in the early 2000s through to the financial crisis. As with those financial 
innovations, there is a possibility of increased levels of economy-wide and global 
systemic risks. 
 
According to the website MoneyMetals.org, ETFs linked to mining and minerals 
markets have become popular precisely because of the lack of transparency of these 
funds. The impacts of increased environmental legislation and concerns by civil 
society groups have induced institutional investors to demand higher standards from 
mining companies. These pressures have increased costs of mining globally. Civil 
society groups are also putting pressure on institutional investors to withdraw from 
companies and countries with poor environmental and human rights records.  
However, financial institutions have created instruments that lack transparency to 
support shareholders and institutional investors that may be subject to civil society 
pressure. For example, they have developed funds that hold shares on behalf of 
investors. They also use ETF for these purposes. MoneyMetals.org explain that it is 
possible for same financial institutions to offer ‘clean’ (in terms of environmental and 
human rights measures) investment funds while also offering funds with investments 
in businesses that violate these ‘clean’ criteria because of the lack of transparency of 
the instruments they have developed. 
 
The increased use of derivatives for speculation in commodities markets and in ETFs 
has had a huge impact on commodities firms, markets and price formation for 
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commodities.  A 2012 Unctad Policy Brief echoes the concerns of the EU above and  
summarizes some of the main issues: 
 
Despite a growing body of evidence on the destabilizing influences emanating from 
financial markets, the “real economy” explanations still dominate the debate. It is not 
commonly recognized that demand from financial investors in the commodity markets 
has become overwhelming during the last decade. Of course, supply and demand shocks 
can still move commodity prices time and again. But with the volumes of exchange-
traded derivatives on commodity markets now being 20 to 30 times larger than physical 
production, the influence of financial markets has systematically transformed these real 
markets into financial markets. This calls for strong and prompt policy and regulatory 
responses in the financial markets, rather than in the physical markets. (Unctad 2012:1.) 
 
The Unctad research shows an increasing correlation between returns on commodities 
markets and other financial markets. They argue that financial investors bet on the 
trends in the commodities markets for the time they are in those markets in the same 
way they bet in financial markets. They also use the same information they use to 
inform their decisions in financial markets for their decisions in commodities markets.  
“They do not trade systematically on the basis of fundamental supply and demand  
relationships in single markets, even if shocks in those markets may influence their 
behaviour temporarily” (ibid, p.2). As a result, there is much more herding behaviour 
in commodities markets that “… introduces spurious signals into the market (ibid, 
p.4).” that has caused growing possibility for ‘volatility leaks’ (see Tang and Xiong, 
2012). The Brief warns, “Because of these distortions, commodity prices in 
financialized markets do not provide correct signals about the relative scarcity of 
commodities. This impairs the allocation of resources and has negative effects on the 
real economy (ibid.)”.  
 
The increased volatility and correlation of commodities prices with trends in global 
financial asset prices poses real problems for the South African economy. The 
relatively uncontrolled movement of capital (most of it short-term flows) into South 
Africa as a result of liberalization of cross-border capital flows causes the neo-liberal 
macroeconomic policies of the country (that focuses on consumer price inflation not 
asset price inflation) to be pro-cyclical. Therefore, periods of increasing global 
liquidity and inflation in the value of financial assets could translate into increased 
short-term flows into South Africa at the same time as commodities prices increase. 
This event could lead to more rapid growth of bubbles in financial asset markets (than 
seen in the 2003 to 2007 period) and potentially more severe crashes in these financial 
assets and equity prices (particularly commodities and financial equities). The 
volatility in commodities markets makes investment planning harder for mining 
companies and promotes a liquidity preference where speculation on price changes is 
more rewarding than long-term real investment in mines and expanding mining 
output. These developments do not favour investment and employment in mining but 
could further deepen financialization of the South African economy. The impact of a 
crisis in commodities markets (whether due to risks in these markets or contagion) on 
the South African economy is a subject for further research, however, one can predict 
that there will be a significant negative impact on the country’s balance of payments 
and employment in mining and closely linked sectors.  
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3 Evidence of financialization in South Africa 
3.1 Evidence of financialization in South Africa at the aggregate level 
This section provides evidence at the aggregate level for financialisation in three 
broad sectors which account for the key institutions in financialised accumulation, 
namely households, financial institutions and non-financial corporations.  
 
3.1.1 Banking, finance and financialisation 
Financial institutions, as issuers and dealers of financial paper, lie at the heart of the 
process of financialisation. Financial institutions are financialised when their function 
in the economy is not primarily to bring together savings from the former into large 
enough units for productive investment in the latter as in traditional understandings of 
the function of banks, but rather to facilitate and fuel financialisation processes in 
households and non-financial corporations, primarily through the diversion of a 
substantial proportion of long term savings into securities. To this extent, it is 
impossible to determine whether financial institutions are financialised if taken in 
isolation and apart from activities in the ‘real’ economy.  
 
The nature of financial sector restructuring and behavior in recent history do, 
however, provide us with a number of indications to the degree of financialisation in 
the South African economy. First, a large and deep financial sector, together with the 
presence of active capital markets, provides the basic conditions for financialisation. 
Table 2.1 compares a number of indicators for the size, depth and intermediation 
efficiency of South Africa’s financial markets with those for the United States - 
arguably the most financialised national economy - upper middle income and high 
income countries. By even high income country standards, South Africa has a highly 
developed, deep, diversified and efficient financial market.  
 
Second, examination of the balance sheet for the banking sector in aggregate shows a 
shift towards holding more short-term assets and liabilities and increasing dependence 
on non-deposit liabilities - namely equities and short-term credit - together with the 
acquisition of securities on the asset side, to finance the massive expansion of credit 
since 2004 (see figures 2.1-2.3).  
 
Third, the process of financialisation involves policy and regulatory reform of the 
financial sector in order to reduce impediments to, and support, the expansion of the 
capital market’s sphere of influence. Informed by the financial liberalization approach 
of the De Kock commission appointed in 1977, comprehensive reform of the financial 
sector was undertaken in the 1980s. The banking sector was deregulated through the 
abolition of specialised bank categories and barriers against foreign entry were 
removed. By 1994, all distinctions between deposit-taking institutions were removed. 
Post reform capital requirements followed international standards as prescribed by 
Basel. Compared with both high and upper-middle income countries, private pension 
and insurance constitute a large part of the financial sector as a result of the historical 
specificities of the South Africa’s economic development under apartheid (see for 
example Ashman & Fine 2012).  
 
The financial sector also saw considerable reforms that would facilitate the expansion 
of flows between capital markets and households in particular. Quantitative credit 
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controls were removed in the early 1980s, which together with higher interest rates 
that came about through neoliberal macroeconomic policy reforms, resulted in supply-
driven credit expansion. Government prescribed asset ratios for pension funds and 
pensions invested with insurance companies were relaxed in the early 1980s which 
made it possible for them to expand investments in equities. Restrictions for official 
pension funds to invest only in fixed public fixed interest securities were lifted in 
1990. More recently, in 2007,  restrictions against selling investment products  fell 
away resulting in the growth in number of private investment funds and savings 
products, namely unit trusts,  as well as the entry into savings by established insurance 
companies e.g. Discovery Invest. 
 
Put simply, the features of the financial sector described above have provided both the 
supply of finance, through expanded credit, as well as the supply of financial 
instruments and assets, to which current and future savings of both households and 
firms can be diverted. 
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Table 0:1. Financial market indicators for South Africa and selected country groupings for 2009 
Country/country group 
Bank 
deposits to 
GDP 
Liquid 
liabilities to 
GDP 
Deposit 
money 
bank assets 
to GDP 
Other 
financial 
institution 
assets to 
GDP 
Private 
credit by 
deposit 
money 
banks and 
other 
financial 
institutions 
to GDP  
Stock 
market 
capitalizati
on to  GDP 
Ratio of 
bank credit 
to bank 
deposits 
Life 
insurance 
premiums 
to GDP 
South Africa 0.67 0.46 0.95 1.18 1.74 3.38 1.29 0.12 
Median for upper middle 
income countries 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.07 0.52 0.78 0.93 0.02 
Median for high income 
countries 0.85 0.84 1.18 0.07 1.08 1.19 1.09 0.04 
United States 0.83 0.77 0.73 1.74 2.19 1.52 0.75 0.05 
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Figure 0.1. Banking sector incurrence of financial liabilities 
 
(Data source: Flow-of-funds tables, SARB 2011) 
 
Figure 0.2. Banking sector acquisition of financial assets 
 
(Data source: Flow-of-funds tables, SARB 2011) 
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Figure 0.3. Credit extended by all monetary institutions as a proportion of 
GDP 
 
(Data source: SARB 2012) 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Households and financialization 
 
‘[T]he household [is] a key institution in a financialised economy, 
where savings and investment circuits divert middle class long term 
savings and expectations for retirement onto the stock market and 
where the household buffers the consequences for individuals who 
have not made necessary savings.’(Froud et. al. 2002, p.125) 
 
In the first decade of the 2000s, on average, 53% of all loans extended to the 
private sector were to households.  The vast proportion of this was in mortgage 
lending and the financing of current consumption (see figure 2.4).
4
 This 
expansion of borrowing by households has driven financialisation in at least two 
ways. First, by financing current consumption, it frees up a larger portion of 
households savings for the acquisition of financial assets, either directly through 
the purchase of equities, the purchase of savings-investment products, namely 
unit trusts, or through life insurance and pension products. Second, the explosion 
in mortgage finance has fuelled house price inflation – by contrast to the period 
from the early 1980s up to 1999 when returns on housing were weak, the Absa 
                                                          
4
 The phenomenon of debt driven consumption in South Africa has been discussed in Mohamed 
(2010) 
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house price index for all sizes increased by almost 300% between January 2000 
and June 2008 (figure 2.5). Associated with house price inflation, has been a 
wealth effect, and the subsequent channelling of more funds into the acquisition 
of financial assets.  
 
Figure 0.4. Credit extended by all monetary institutions to the domestic 
private sector 
 
(Data source: SARB 2012) 
 
Figure 0.5 Absa House Price Index for Small, Medium and Large Properties, 
2000=100 
 
(Data source: ABSA 2012) 
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Figure 0.6. Ratio of household savings to disposable income 
 
(Data source: National Accounts, SARB 2012) 
 
Figure 0.7 Aggregate household assets and liabilities from 1975 to 2011 
 
Data source: (Flow-of-Funds, SARB 2012) 
 
The savings and investment behaviour of households has changed profoundly 
since the 1970s. Household savings as a share of disposable income has followed 
a downward trend since 1970, albeit with less volatility since 1994 (figure 2.5). In 
2005, the ratio of  savings to disposable income for households fell below zero, 
representing dissaving, which has occurred as a result of growing indebtedness 
(increased incurrence of financial liabilities) and not a  fall in the acquisition of 
financial assets by households (figure 2.6). Households in aggregate appear to be 
saving for the future through the acquisition of financial assets, without forgoing 
current consumption which has been financed by debt.   
 
Figure 2.7 charts aggregate household assets and liabilities from 1975 to 2011. 
The distribution of household savings across asset types has shifted in aggregate. 
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While household liabilities as a share of GDP has been increasing since the mid-
1980s as financial market deregulation took place, household assets remained 
relatively stagnant as a share of GDP until 2000 when it began to increase 
dramatically, in part owing to increasing house prices. What is of particular 
interest is that the ratio of household liabilities to assets has been increasing since 
the early 1980s, dips a little in the period immediately after 1994, only to increase 
as the share of household assets to GDP increases. What this suggests is that the 
period after 1994 is structurally different from that in the period between financial 
deregulation in the 1980s and 1994, with the latter associated with financialisation 
processes as households increase the amount borrowed for current consumption 
expenditures in order to channel more of their income into the acquisition of 
assets, particularly financial assets.  
 
The share of financial assets to all assets held by households increased year on 
year from 44% in 1976 to 76% at its peak in 1999 and averaged 70% between 
2000 and 2010
5
. The composition of financial assets has also shifted, with a 
decline in the share of money deposits and an increase in the share of interest in 
pension funds and long-term insurers (which make up the bulk of financial 
investments) and other financial assets which include unit-trusts and direct 
holding of equity instruments by households.  
 
Through pension funds and long-term insurers, households have increased their 
exposure to capital markets. Pension funds and long-term insurers themselves 
have oriented their investments towards short-term equities (ordinary shares) and 
reducing their share of fixed-interest government and non-government securities, 
fixed property and loans (figures 2.10 & 2.11). Insurers today resemble 
investment funds. The proportion of pension fund assets invested with insurers in 
2011 was around 50% of all assets. 
 
Figure 0.8. Household assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP: 1975- 
2011 
                                                          
5
 The slight reduction in the share of financial to total assets held by households from 2000 can 
be explained by the increase in the share of the value of housing assets inflated by credit 
expansion after 1999 as explained earlier. 
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(Data source: Household Balance Sheet, SARB 2012) 
 
Figure 0.9. Distribution of Household Assets
 
(Data source: Household Balance Sheet, SARB 2012) 
 
Figure 0.10. Distribution of assets held by private self-administered pension 
and provident funds 
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(Data source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin 2012) 
 
Figure 0.11 Distribution of assets held by long-term insurers 
 
(Data source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin 2012) 
 
Thus far, we have only presented evidence for changes in household savings and 
investment behaviour with financialisation at the aggregate level. It goes without 
saying that aggregate categories will obscure the diversity across its constituents. 
This is particularly striking in South Africa owing pervasive and worsening 
inequalities. The income and net wealth Gini coefficients are 0.68 and 0.90 
respectively (Finn, Leibbrandt & Levinsohn 2012). Amongst the components of 
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assets and debts, financial asset are the most unequally distributed, with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.95 (ibid.).With 85% of all assets in the hands of the top 10 percent 
most wealthy and 75% in the top 5 percent (ibid.), the aggregate story on shifting 
savings and investment behaviour of households with financialisation is a story of 
a wealthy minority.  It is only the relatively wealthy that can put 5-10% of their 
disposable income into the acquisition of financial assets through pension, 
insurance and savings plans. Only the few at the very top of the wealth 
distribution directly hold equities. This can be seen in the distribution of assets 
across wealth percentiles (see figure 2.10). So what about the 75% of the 
population who are unable to forego, or borrow for, current consumption in order 
to pay into a pension, insurance or savings plan?  
 
‘The household savings circuit through the stock market directly 
accelerates the inequalities of old age and ensures that a majority of 
the population derives little benefit from any distribution of dividends 
or the rise of corporate share prices’ (Froud, Johal & Williams 2002) 
 
Increasing incomes from dividends and interest payments of the very top of the 
income distribution has also driven worsening income inequality since 1994. The 
incomes of South Africans in aggregate increased by 130% between 1993 and 
2008 compared with a median of just 15%; increases in incomes have been driven 
by a small number with very large increases (Leibbrant and Levinsoln 2011). This 
corroborates with findings by Palma (2009) that worsening income inequality in 
the United States was largely driven by the very large increases in income of the 
top 1% of the income distribution through increased earnings from financial 
activities. 
 
Figure 0.12. Distribution of household assets by wealth percentile 
 
(Based on data from Daniels, Finn and Musundwa 2012) 
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Financialisation has led to changes in the savings and investment behaviour of the 
25% of households at the tops of the income and wealth distributions. For these 
households, future income and consumption have become highly integrated with 
capital markets as they increasingly depend upon dividend and interest payments 
and stock prices. This, together with the lack of access to financial assets and 
credit for the majority has profound implications on income and wealth 
inequality.  
 
1.1.2 Non-financial corporations and financialisation  
The third key institution in the financialised system of accumulation is the non-
financial corporation (NFC). The process of financialisation has to be understood 
in terms of changes in the structure and processes of capitalist accumulation.  
Restructuring of the financial sector and capital markets under financialisation has 
made it possible for the financial sector to capture and distribute an increasing 
share of the surplus. Changes in the savings and investment behaviour of 
households through greater integration with capital markets has determined a 
highly unequal and unequalising distribution of this surplus between households. 
But how has financialisation changed the behaviour of non-financial corporations, 
the institutions that produce the capitalist surplus?  
 
 
Firms’ behaviour under the traditional ‘productionist’ model saw firms as the core 
site of capital accumulation where surpluses from the process of production were 
largely reinvested to increase the capital stock and thus the productive base of the 
firm. At the level of the firm, financialisation has been operationally defined as 
the increase in financial operations and motives of NFCs. Two quantitative 
indicators of financialisation of NFCs that have been cited in the literature are the 
increasing share of financial to total assets, and the increase in income derived 
from dividend and interest payments. (Orhangazi, 2011) Figure 2.13 shows 
financial assets as a percentage of fixed capital stock has been increasing since the 
1980s. Rather than signaling the onset of financialisation, the increase between 
1980 and the early 1990s should be interpreted as the consequence of economic 
sanctions, tight capital controls and that kept capital within the country together 
with the reluctance to invest in physical investments for fear of seizure in the case 
of political transition. Net corporate earnings from interest and dividend 
payments, as captured in the amounts receivable category within the flow-of-
funds accounts, shot up as a share of internal funds in 1994, fluctuating between 
1% and 20% in the period 1994 to 2004 before becoming negative, representing 
an outflow of funds from the non-financial corporate business sector (figure 2.14), 
indicating that financialisation began in earnest with the democratic transition. 
 
As discussed above, financialisation comes with changes in the savings and 
investment behaviour of non-financial corporations with the tendency towards 
shorter planning horizons, increasing dividend payments through share buybacks 
and increasing financial activities associated with short-term returns, and 
consequently, a reduction in ‘productive’ fixed investment. 
 
Figure 0.13. Financial assets as a percentage of fixed capital stock for non-
financial corporations in South Africa: 1970-2010 
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Authors’ calculations based on flow-of-funds tables compiled by SARB 2011  
 
 
Figure 0.14.. Amounts receivable as a percentage of internal funds for non-
financial corporations in South Africa: 1970-2010 
 
Author’s own calculations based on flow-of-funds tables compiled by SARB 2011  
 
From figure 2.15, we see that the increasing acquisition of financial assets has 
gone hand-in-hand with low levels of fixed investment in South Africa since the 
mid-1980s. The underlying relationship between low levels of fixed investment 
and high levels of financial asset acquisition in the late apartheid period differs 
from that post 1994 with political uncertainty and trapped capital explaining the 
relationship in the former period and the crowding out of real investment through 
various processes of financialisation at the level of the firm explaining the 
relationship in the latter period..  
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Net fixed capital investment recovered after 1994, but remained below levels in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, but without a reduction in the acquisition of financial 
assets. From the onset of the debt crisis until 1994, non-financial corporations in 
South Africa had been net lenders (positive net financial investors). Lending to 
other sectors made up the greatest share of financial acquisitions in the 1970s and 
1980s and included trade credit and other short-term loans, long-term loans and 
mortgage loans (figure 2.16). During 1988 there was a significant increase in the 
acquisition of liquid assets
6
 that has persisted into the post-apartheid period. On 
average cash/money made up 19% of annual financial acquisitions in the period 
1970-1987 compared to an annual mean of 48% from 1988-2010. In addition to 
the increased acquisition of liquid assets, the period from 1994 saw further shifts 
in the composition of financial acquisitions from mainly lending to other sectors 
and money assets
7
 to greater diversification across a variety of financial assets, 
notably the acquisition of ordinary shares, fixed interest securities and other 
assets
8
. The asset side of the non-financial corporate balance sheet has shifted 
towards increasingly short-term assets. (Ashman and Newman 2012) 
 
Figure 0.15. Net annual capital formation, acquisition of financial assets and 
financial investment by non-financial corporations in South Africa: 1970-
2010 
                                                          
6
 This is shown by the money/cash category which includes cash and demand monetary deposits, 
short/medium-term monetary deposits, long-term deposits, deposits with other financial 
institutions and deposits with other institutions 
7
 Cash/money assets are defined here as the sum of cash and demand monetary deposits, 
short/medium-term monetary deposits and deposits with other institutions. In the context of 
low interest rates, it might be argued that these money deposits cannot be legitimately 
considered financial assets. In contrast to Europe since the onset of the global financial crisis 
where the holding of money assets reflects an investment freeze owing to uncertainties about 
future economic performance, money deposits in South African commercial banks earn 
competitive returns. Even demand deposits in South African commercial banks can earn monthly 
interest rates between 2% and 3% (see for example Standardbank’s AccessSave account) and can 
thus be considered a financial asset.   
8
 This is a catch all category for a growing number of new financial assets, which tend to be short-
term in nature, which may include debt securities and other derivative instruments.  
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Flow-of-funds tables, SARB 2011 
 
Figure 0.16. Acquisition of financial assets by non-financial corporations by 
asset type: 1970-2010 
 
Flow-of-funds tables, SARB 2011 
 
Figure 0.17. Annual financing gap, external financing and the difference 
between the two for the non-financial corporate businesses: 1970-2010 
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Flow-of-funds tables, SARB 2011 
 
The period since 1994 has also seen non-financial corporations moving from their 
positions of net lenders to net borrowers for all years except for 1996, 1997 and 
2002 suggesting that increased acquisition of financial assets has been financed 
through the expansion of credit. We find further evidence that increased external 
borrowing by non-financial corporations to finance the acquisition of financial 
assets when we examine the evolution of the financing gap
9
 for non-financial 
corporations and their external financing
10
 (figure 2.17). The difference between 
the financing gap and external financing has fluctuated around a relatively stable 
mean from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s when this difference began to 
follow a positive trend until 2010. Between 2004 and 2008, bank credit 
dominated the liabilities side of the non-financial sector balance sheet, coinciding 
with an increase in the difference between the financing gap and external 
financing for non-financial corporations (figures 2.18 & 2.19). Moreover, there 
has been a shift in the composition of financial liabilities held by non-financial 
corporations with an expansion of ordinary shares and other short-term liabilities 
from 1994 (figure 16). Owing to maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, 
the short-term nature of liabilities is not conducive to long-term productive 
investments which drive capital accumulation. Consequently, we have seen the 
financing of the acquisition of (largely short-term) financial assets rather than 
fixed capital.  (Ashman and Newman 2012) 
 
Figure 0.18. Sources of external financing by non-financial corporations: 
1970-2010 
                                                          
9
 The financing gap is equal to net borrowing which is the difference between net savings and net 
capital formation. 
10
 External financing is equal to the net incurrence of financial liabilities. 
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Flow-of-funds tables, SARB 2011 
 
Figure 0.19. Breakdown of the sources of credit received by non-financial 
corporations: 1970-2010 
 
Flow-of-funds tables, SARB 2011 
 
 
1.1.3 Financialisation of the South African Economy and the 
Savings and Investment Process 
 
The discussion of financialisation of households, financial institutions and non-
financial corporations above can begin to reveal what underlies changes in the 
savings and investment process of the economy as a whole (figure 2.20). A gap 
has opened up, and widened, between gross savings and gross capital formation 
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since 1994. This can be explained by an increasing share of savings being 
channeled towards financial investment by savers together with the shifting 
patterns of investment by non-financial corporations. 
 
Gross domestic savings has stagnated since 2002 with an increase in gross 
savings being driven by capital inflows from the rest of the world attracted by 
high interest rates healthy returns on South African capital markets. This stands in 
contrast to the view that the problem with the South African financial sector is its 
failure to mobilise savings for investment through the availability of suitable 
financial products. Rather, low domestic savings continues to be a function of 
inequality, where the majority of the population has little or no income to spare 
after current consumption expenditures.  The financial sector attracts short-term 
and speculative rather than long-term productive investments. These short-term 
inflows finance a large current account deficit and maintain the overall balance of 
payments, but this is at the expense of productive investment and employment 
creation.  
 
Figure 0.20. Investment-savings gap 
 
Flow-of-funds tables, SARB 2011 
 
Need a concluding section that links to the next section. 
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4 Financialisation and corporate change in South Africa 
 
As we saw above, global processes of corporate restructuring driven by 
financialisation began in the US and Europe. These global processes have 
influenced the shape of the restructuring and internationalization of South 
Africa’s largest corporations and also the changing functions and behaviour of 
financial institutions in South Africa. These important changes took place in the 
context of the transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. During this 
period, big business played a complex role. In the pre-transition period there was 
recognition that apartheid would not survive, but there was reluctance to accept 
the losses that would be associated with any collapse of the apartheid economy. 
As such, big business played an important role in supporting the apartheid state 
and economy (Terreblanche 2002). One way of doing this was buying up the 
assets of divesting foreign corporations.  As a consequence, large South African 
corporations became even more diversified during the height of disinvestment 
during the late 1980s. At the same time, prominent business figures began 
discussions with the banned and exiled African National Congress about political 
change in South Africa. By the time of the first democratic elections, much of big 
business had developed plans for both restructuring what they now considered to 
be oversized and diversified businesses and for moving large amounts of capital 
abroad in part to protect it from the possible actions of a future black majority 
government. At the same time, however, they wanted to maintain their profitable 
South African operations, particularly in mining where South Africa, despite the 
relative decline of gold, remains an important global player.  
 
Mineral reserves as well as South Africa’s potential to act as a ‘gateway’ into the 
rest of the African continent meant that there would not be complete withdrawal 
by business elites. Big business remained an active force in lobbying the new 
government and was a willing participant in the government’s black economic 
empowerment plans. At the same time, the market power of big business, the 
cartels that operated in almost every economic subsector and the growing and 
now liberalised financial system continued to dominate the economy. The 
continuing importance of mining and financial groups in the South African 
economy can be seen in tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
4:1. Summary of control of JSE market capitalization (% of total) 
  2012 2011 2010 2009 2007 2005 2000 1995 1991 
FOREIGN 30 29.8 27.9 33.1 20.7 14.2 3.9 4.1 1.9 
INSTITUTIONS 19.4 17 17.6 14.4 12.6 13.7 6.7 1.7 4.9 
DIRECTORS 9.2 8.9 8.3 7.7 9.4 8.2 8.9 11.4 5.4 
SABMILLER 9.2 7.5 6.5 5.9 5.5 4.9 2.8     
ANGLOAMERICAN CORP 8.9 11.8 13 10.6 20.8 17.3 23.6 37.1 42.4 
REMBRANDT 7.2 5.2 5.1 3.8 6.7 7.8 11 7.8 15.2 
BLACKGROUPS 3.9 4.6 5.4 7 5.5 5.8 5.7     
RMB/FIRSTRAND 3.9 3.1 2.8 2.5 3.1 5 2.9 1   
SAMUTUAL 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.8 4 4.5 11 11.2 10.4 
SANLAM 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 13.2 12.7 13.2 
29 
 
29 
 
LIBERTYLIFE/ 
STANDARDBANK 
1.1 2.4 3.9 4.3 3.4 4.3 5.2 7.3 3.7 
BIDVESTGROUP 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 1     
INVESTEC 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 1 1.9 0.9   
PSG 0.6                 
STATE 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.5 1.8 2.5       
ALTECH 0.1 0.1               
ABSA          2.5       
SASOL* 3.9 3.5 4.6 3.5 4.6 4.2 2.6 1.7   
ANGLOVAAL+        0.7  2.9  2.9 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Who owns Whom (2013) 
 
 
 
4:2. Current ownership of previous top 5 
  2012 2011 2010 2009 2007 2005 2000 1995 1991 
FOREIGN 30 29.8 27.9 33.1 20.7 14.2 3.9 4.1 1.9 
ANGLO AMERICAN CORP 8.9 11.8 13 10.6 20.8 17.3 23.6 37.1 42.4 
REMBRANDT 7.2 5.2 5.1 3.8 6.7 7.8 11 7.8 15.2 
SA MUTUAL 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.8 4 4.5 11 11.2 10.4 
SANLAM 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 13.2 12.7 13.2 
LIBERTYLIFE/STANDARDBA
NK 
1.1 2.4 3.9 4.3 3.4 4.3 5.2 7.3 3.7 
Top 5 groups collectively 21.9 23.5 26 22.7 36.1 35.5 64 76.1 84.9 
Source: Who owns Whom (2013) 
 
From the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the top 5 conglomerates controlled more than 
80% of the capitalization of the JSE (Table 4.2). Four of these five groups are 
mining and finance groups. There is also a high level of interpenetration between 
mining and finance groups. By the 2000s this top five controlled 64% of the 
capitalization on the JSE and five years later this control declined to 35.5%, in 
2010 it was 26% and 2012 it had declined to 22% (Table 4.1). A large share of the 
decline has occurred because of significant corporate restructuring and increased 
internationalization of the largest South African corporations. Some 4 of the 5 
companies that were the top 5 (in terms of market capitalization on the JSE) have 
moved their primary listings or jointly listed on foreign stock exchanges.  
However, the control of these groups had not changed as much as the drop in the 
share of market capitalization implies. Roberts and Machaka (2002) find: 
 
In the top 10 companies in 2002, only three – Sasol, originally a 
state-owned enterprise, and two foreign-controlled firms created 
by conglomerate restructuring (Billiton and South African 
Breweries, SAB) – were independent of the main conglomerates. 
Although listed separately, three of the top 10 (Anglo American, 
Angloplat, and Anglogold) are still effectively part of the Anglo 
group. The other top ten firms – Richemont, Old Mutual, 
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Goldfields and Impalaplats – are all tied into conglomerate holding 
structures. 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the percentage of foreign-control of the JSE market 
capitalization increased from 1.9% in 1991 to 10.1% in 2002 and was 30% in 
2012 (having peaked at 33% in 2009). There have been some acquisitions of local 
companies by foreign firms but most of the change in foreign ownership is the 
result of the change in the structure of South African firms now listed overseas. 
Increased speculative short-term foreign portfolio investment inflows also 
contributed to the growing levels of foreign institutional ownership. As a 
result, South African listed corporations are subject to both the volatility 
associated with shifting global portfolio capital flows and the demands of the 
shareholder value movement and credit ratings agencies. 
 
The South African Competition Commission (2009) provides important insights 
into South Africa’s industrial structure after the large scale corporate restructuring 
of the 1990s and early-2000s. They say: 
 
The South African economy is still dominated by many of the 
traditional power groups even after the unbundling since 1994. 
It must also be remembered that unbundling by conglomerates 
does not generally decrease the concentration of ownership 
within sectors. In most instances there has in fact been an 
increase in concentration which raises concerns about possible 
anti-competitive behaviour in the economy (Competition 
Commission, 2009, p.22).  
 
The most powerful corporations have been able to use their economic, market and 
political power earned over the last century to maintain their dominance over the 
South African economy while internationalizing their operations. They have 
attempted to be players in the process of unprecedented global corporate 
restructuring, described by Nolan (2003) as a global business revolution. Many 
have also shifted their corporate listings to developed economies, particularly the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE), and by so doing have had to allow themselves to 
be influenced and reshaped by institutional investors. Some of them such as 
Anglo American have been forced to focus on their core businesses whilst others, 
such as the executives of Billiton had to settle for accepting a leadership from 
another larger corporation and corporate culture after merger with BHP. 
Internationalization, then, may have earned some of the larger institutional 
shareholders and controlling families handsome returns but it has set them into a 
new global context where competition is much harder and global concentration 
has increased across many economic sectors. 
 
The review of the Competition Commission says: 
 
The oligopolistic nature of many of South Africa’s industries has been built on a range of 
institutional linkages such as the informal market-sharing agreements reported in many 
subsectors of the economy. Information sharing and trust are two of the most important 
requirements of collusion and, while new entrants into sectors may have a major impact 
on the degree of rivalry and competitiveness in a sector, the barriers to entry remain high 
in most sectors. These barriers can be endogenous, that is, the result of strategic 
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behaviour by dominant firms and of formal and informal links between potential rivals. 
The barriers can also be increased by vertical integration in the South African economy 
which has been one of the patterns under conglomerate restructuring (ibid.). 
 
Black economic empowerment has been an important programme driven by the 
government. Black-owned companies, many led by politically well-connected 
individuals, have taken control of businesses in many sectors. As Goldstein 
(2001) points out, white big business acted expediently and voluntarily sold off 
section of sectors to black-owned businesses as a way to gain political capital. 
Notwithstanding their political connections, black controlled businesses remain 
relatively small players. Table 4.1 shows that in 2012 they controlled only 3.9 
percent of the capitalization of the JSE. Black business groups have not attempted 
to break new ground or found common cause with attempts to shift the economy 
onto a new economic growth path. Instead BEE ventures have been largely in  
traditional economic areas of mining and finance and have often chosen to focus 
on managing portfolios of shares in holding companies. Often these portfolios 
consist of shares in companies unloaded by the large South African corporations 
in their efforts to focus on core business.
11
This paper is unable to deal with black 
economic empowerment comprehensively, but in many respects BEE has added 
to the financialization of the economy, not challenged it.  
 
Changing corporate structure and executive behaviour is one of the most 
important implications of financialization on South African industry and the 
economy. Global and domestic factors shaped the behaviour of South African big 
business. Goldstein’s research indicates that the boom in merger and acquisitions 
in South Africa during the 1990s was different to those in other countries. The 
restructuring in South Africa was more about dismantling pyramid structures than 
increasing the competitiveness of industrial sectors. Goldstein (2000:17) says, “Of 
the twenty largest South African deals reported in 1992-98, 75% corresponds to 
the simplification of the corporate structure; 10% to consolidation in the financial 
industry; 10% to foreign acquisitions; and only one deal – TransNatal’s 
acquisition of Rand Coal to form Ingwe Coal in 1994 – is a “genuine” South 
African merger.” Goldstein also says that it is noteworthy that South African 
conglomerates hardly made any large acquisitions within South Africa itself. 
Instead restructuring and offshore listings led to a situation where: 
 
 powerful families took rewards in global markets in exchange for giving 
up control and influence 
 large South African corporations reduced diversification to increase focus 
on core business globally 
 there was a separation of mining-finance groups with mining companies 
taking less interest in non-mining industry and finance focused on 
growing financial services 
 financial services expanded into global markets with an initial focus on 
developed countries, offshore havens and later control of banking in other 
African countries 
 
                                                          
11
 Many BEE ventures also hold shares in certain businesses because government has introduced 
sector charters for black economic empowerment that list the amount of black ownership in each 
industrial sector. 
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The families and groups that controlled the South African corporate landscape 
generally chose members of the boards of directors and influenced the 
appointment of executives of the major South African corporations and their 
subsidiaries.
12
 The composition of boards and senior management of corporate 
South Africa has not changed significantly but the influence of the shareholder 
interests on them has increased.  
 
Ernst and Young (2002) in a review of South African mergers and acquisitions for 
2001 state: 
 
Shareholder activism has been slow to take off in South Africa, but like all 
global trends it is one, which is catching up with us very quickly. The 
prominent South African companies that have listed offshore over the last 
two or three years have already been exposed to the higher level of 
transparency demanded in global markets. South African companies with a 
more domestic orientation are under pressure to emulate their global peers 
(p.27). 
 
4.1 Anglo American PLC: a case study of financialization 
 
The case of AAC provides an important indication of the impact of 
financialization of the South African economy because of its overall importance 
to the South African economy. Anglo American is by far the most important 
South African company. The history of South Africa (since the discovery of 
diamonds and gold) is intimately tied to the development of AAC (Innes 1984). 
All economic sectors have been shaped by Anglo’s involvement and 
diversification to some extent. At the time of the transition to democracy, AAC 
was South Africa’s largest natural resource company, with an annual turnover of 
nearly $25 billion in 1993. At points in its history, AAC has been the world’s 
biggest gold, platinum and diamond producer (Innes 1984). It also ran the world’s 
most successful global cartel, the Central Selling Organization (CSO). Until the 
1980s it was a dominant player in South African finance through its control of 
First National Bank. In the 1990s, AAC had 100 subsidiaries in South Africa and 
manufacturing accounted for about 30 per cent of its revenues. By the time of the 
first democratic elections in 1994, AAC’s activities collectively accounted for 
43.3 per cent of the JSE’s market capitalization (Goldstein 2000). The 
Oppenheimer family directly owned only 8.1 per cent of the company, but had 
ultimate control due to the complex pyramid structure of ownership. 
 
The manufacturing interests of Anglo before the restructuring were not limited to 
the MEC. It had significant holdings and often control of certain markets in 
construction, printing and publishing (it controlled the largest newspaper group), 
automobiles (retail and manufacturing) and freight services. Anglo also owned 
10% of Barlow Rand and had significant influence over the company. In 1970 
Barlow Rand owned more than 70 manufacturing companies and increased this 
number steadily (in 2000 it was renamed as Barlow World an international 
distributor of leading global brands and logistical services).  
                                                          
12
 Innes (1984) provides a good discussion of family and group control over the South African 
corporate landscape. 
33 
 
33 
 
 
After the restructuring of the late-1990s, the only manufacturing outside of the 
MEC sector Anglo was involved in was paper and publishing (Mondi Ltd in 
South Africa) and sugar and starch (in the Tongaat-Hulett Group, which also 
produces aluminium). By 2007 AAC had sold off these ‘non-core businesses. It 
held onto Boart Longyear in South Africa, which produces tools and equipment 
and services for the international mining industry. However, Anglo chose to shift 
the engineering and design segments of that business to Europe before it sold it to 
a private equity company in 2005. Thus, the one important area of capital and 
transport equipment where South Africa had built a technological lead due to 
innovation in mining and minerals processing has been shifted offshore. By 2011, 
Anglo had unloaded all its non-mining subsidiaries and had also moved out of 
gold mining in South Africa (through the sale of its remaining share in Anglogold 
Ashanti in 2009). 
 
Roberts et al (YEAR) list some of the major developments in AAC’s 
restructuring: 
 Unbundling of JCI, to separate Anglo American Platinum (Amplats) in 
1995. 
 The merging of gold interests under AngloGold in 1997 and the 
restructuring of platinum holdings under Amplats in the same year. 
 In 1998, Anglo merged its financial service interests of FNB and Southern 
Life with RMB to create FirstRand and then swapped its 15.3 per cent 
stake with Rembrandt for 7.1 per cent of Billiton and 11.3 per cent of 
Goldfields in 2000. 
 After merging with Minorco in 1998, AAC listed on the London Stock 
Exchange in 1999. 
 The de-listing of De Beers and the breaking of the AAC-De Beers cross-
holdings in 2001, which meant the Oppenheimer’s essentially having 
control of De Beers, but reducing their stake in AAC to 5.1 per cent and to 
a large extent losing control of AAC. 
 Diversified industrial interests were unbundled, including AECI and 
Bevcon (with holdings in SAB). In 2007 it unbundled Mondi and 
Highveld Steel and Vanadium. 
 It looked set to take control of South Africa’s main iron ore deposits 
through acquisition of stakes in Kumba and Avmin in 2002, but has 
withdrawn from Avmin following prolonged proceedings of the 
Competition Tribunal and Appeal Court. And, sold of its remaining shares 
in Highveld Steel and Vanadium in 2007. Engaged in huge investment in 
Brazil in Minas Rios. 
 International acquisitions in minerals such as Colombia’s Cervejon 
Centrale Coal and Cerrejon Zona Norte, Australia’s Shell Coal, Chilean 
copper mines Empresa Minera de Mantos Blancos and Disputada, 
Australia’s Acacia Resources and nickel producer, Anaconda 
 International acquisitions in paper and pulp such as interests in Brazilian 
firm Aracruz Cellulose, Russian firm Syktyvkar Forest Enterprise, and 
French packaging firm La Rochette. By 2007 with the demerger of Mondi. 
Anglo had withdrawn from paper and pulp. 
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 Construction materials and aggregates in Europe include the UK’s Tarmac 
and Spain’s Mavike. 
 
As a result of the restructuring Anglo American became one of the world's largest 
mining and natural resources companies, with interests in gold, platinum and 
diamonds, and an important global player in coal, base and ferrous metals, 
industrial minerals, and forest products. After being one of the major players in 
the global gold industry for most of the Twentieth Century, Anglo has sold off its 
interests in gold. Carmody (2003: 263-4)) argues, “By moving their headquarters 
to London, and financially delinking from South Africa, these companies are able 
to unlock ‘shareholder value’. While the stock market capitalization of many 
companies in advanced capitalist countries, such as the US, are above their net 
asset values on the basis of projected future profits, Anglo’s market capitalisation 
was 22 per cent below its net asset value in 1995”. Anglo still has substantial 
assets in South Africa but these are less than 50% of its total assets today. In 2011 
South African assets were 35% of turnover and 31% of total operating profits 
(before exceptional items). 
 
The financial arm of Anglo, Anglo American Capital PLC seems to have become 
an important part of the group, even though it is not mentioned in the 2012 
Annual report when discussing the contributions of subsidiaries to incomes, 
profits and the balance sheet. The Anglo websites says that Anglo American 
Capital PLC is wholly owned by it and is its principle financing vehicle. Anglo 
guarantees notes issued by Anglo American Capital PLC. One of the indicators of 
financialization of non-financial corporations often used is the increasing 
importance of the financial arms (see for example Crotty 2002, Epstein 2005 and 
Froud et al 2007). Table 4.3 shows that the net assets of Anglo American Capital 
PLC, which is wholly owned by the Anglo American Corporation, is over 25% of 
the size of the net assets of the Anglo American Corporation. 
 
 
Table 4:3. Comparing assets and liabilities of Anglo American Corporation 
and Anglo American Capital 
2012 AA Corporation AA Capital AA Capital AA Cap as 
  US$ millions Pound millions US$ millions % of AA Corp. 
Total Assets 79369 25445 38702 48.8% 
Total 
Liabilities 35582 17550 26694 75.0% 
Net Assets 43787 7895 12008 27.4% 
Note: AA Corp.’s financial statements are reported in US$ and AA Capital’s are reported in 
British Pounds. An average exchange rate for 2012 of 1B Pound = US$1.521 was used to convert 
AA Capitals assets and liabilities into US$. 
Source: AAC 2012 Annual Report and AA Capital’s 2012 Annual financial statements. 
 
An examination of Anglo’s only non-MEC manufacturing segment paper and 
packaging, before its disposal, showed that it had increased its European holding 
in paper and packaging. Almost all the turnover from paper and packaging in 
Europe was from value added products. The restructuring of their paper business 
shifted value-added production to its European operations and after the 
restructuring only one-third of the graphic papers and packaging papers was 
35 
 
35 
 
produced in South Africa while the less value-added products like lumber, wood 
chips and mining timber were produced only in South Africa. Thus, before 
unloading its paper and pulp interests, Anglo shifted the high value-added and 
higher technology parts of the business to Europe leaving South Africa with low 
value-added production and exports and more reliant on importing higher value-
added manufactured products that had been produced in the country. This sector, 
as with the technical capacity in the mining capital goods sectors, illustrates the 
impact of the restructuring of Anglo on South Africa as withdrawal of value-
added sectors from the South African economy. 
 
One important development that is related to the financialisation of commodities 
markets is that the trend in share prices of mining companies does not reflect 
changes in commodities prices (PWC 2012). PWC reports that “2011 was a year 
of a growing disconnect for the mining industry. Mining company stocks 
significantly underperformed the broader markets and lost value despite record 
profits, and the disconnect between share values and many commodity prices 
widened (PWC, 2012, p. 1).” Their report on global mining in 2012 shows even 
more problems, lower profits and lower share prices for the global mining 
industry (PWC, 2013).  
 
An important development related to financialisation is the demands by 
shareholders and institutional investors for higher short-term returns. PWC 
reports, “In 2011 shareholders became more vocal that the Top 40 should give 
more profits back, either by way of dividends or shareholder buybacks. While the 
industry paid out a record $32 billion in dividends and bought back $26 billion in 
shares, shareholders have said they want more (PWC, 2012, p.2).” The subject of 
our case study, Anglo American, provides a good example of the response of a 
large mining corporation to the pressure to increase dividends to shareholders. 
Anglo’s underlying operating profits dropped to US$6.2 bn in 2012 from US$ 
11.1 bn in 2011; they had reduced income from platinum in South Africa because 
of industrial action and had to write down US$4 bn because of problems in their 
Minas Rios iron ore project in Brazil. The company reported a loss attributable to 
equity shareholders of US$1.5 bn. Notwithstanding, these troubles and overall 
poor performance, they increased their dividend to US$0.85 in 2012 from 
US$0.74 in 2011 when the profit attributable to equity shareholders was US$ 6.6 
bn. They did not report any share buybacks after 2009. An article on 
MiningMX.com, Michael Coulson says, “Over the past four years [David] 
Shapiro reckons Anglo spent US$10,5bn on repurchasing 212m shares. They're 
now worth around $3bn. That's a cool $7bn wiped off its asset base, plus 
whatever it's lost on Anglo Platinum/AngloGold transactions”. This article may 
explain the reason for no recent share buybacks but it also shows that AAC, as 
with the refocus on core business, was trying to appease the shareholder value 
movement by increasing its share price in the short-term through share buybacks. 
 
 
In conclusion, the restructuring and relisting of Anglo American has been one of 
the most important changes in the South African economy. While Anglo does still 
hold substantial assets in South Africa, the shedding of almost all manufacturing 
businesses implies an important withdrawal of the most important and influential 
conglomerate from downstream value added production in South Africa.  
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financialization of mining companies and commodities markets have 
consequences for the prices of commodities and the allocation of capital. 
 
 
5. The Impact of Financialization on Labour and 
Employment 
 
This section argues that the growth of finance and financialization has had 
negative consequences for South African labour in terms of conditions of 
employment, types of employment, and overall levels of employment. The 
finance-induced focus on short term high returns, combined with trade 
liberalization, has led to de-industrialization and changing employment patterns, 
both to the detriment of labour. Services have grown under the impact of debt 
driven consumption but employment in these sectors is frequently outsourced and 
casualized, trends in employment we also see in mining and manufacturing. 
 
Again, the impacts of financialization have to be considered in the context of the 
particular history and institutions that developed in South Africa. The central 
place of workers’ struggles in the liberation movement meant that the demands 
for labour relations reform were high on the agenda throughout the negotiations 
period and during the ANC’s early years in office. The black trade union 
movement had already won significant ground during the 1980s and had forced 
significant change to workplace organization by challenging apartheid workplace 
forms of control and discipline (Von Holdt 2003; Omar and Webster 2004). 
Labour relations reforms were passed very quickly. On the one hand the ANC 
government implemented neo-liberal economic policies as set out in GEAR (the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme adopted by government in 
1996), such as inflation targeting, deficit cutting and trade and further financial 
liberalization. On the other hand, they implemented a progressive new labour 
relations regime.  A number of statutes were adopted once the ANC took power:  
 The National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC) Act 
of 1994  
 The Labor Relations Act of 1995 (LRA)  
 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (BCEA)  
 The Skills Development Act of 1998  
 The Employment Equity Act of 1998  
 The Social Plan Act of 1998 
 
The new legislation indicated that the relationship between the state and business 
would be different in a democratic South Africa and that pressure by the trade 
unions, the majority of the electorate (who are black) and democratic standards 
would shape institutions in the workplace and labour markets. Unfortunately, the 
shift to neo-liberal economic thinking within the state created a situation where 
macroeconomic and financial policies favoured big business. Labour may have 
won the battle for progressive legislation but they lost the war for progressive 
economic policies.  
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And so combined with global factors, we see South African capital responding to 
the specific national context, to changes in labour relations, and to what (at first, 
at least) appeared to be their relative loss of power. There has been restructuring 
of the workplace and improvements for black workers in the largest enterprises.  
However, strategies such as moving production offshore, limiting new investment 
in the economy, overseas listings and general capital flight, have led to job losses 
being combined with the use of capital intensive production methods.  
 
Business has resisted unions’ attempts to democratize firm level decision-making 
Instead, many have worked to undermine central bargaining and to bypass the 
national industry bargaining councils. They increasingly entered into agreements 
at enterprise level and introduced individualized performance management and 
reward systems.  
 
Importantly, there has been a significant increase in the contracting out of services 
and ‘non-core’ activities by businesses and the casualization of jobs that were 
once full-time. Increasing outsourcing of manufacturing and mining jobs has left 
many more workers with precarious employment, harsher and less safe working 
conditions, lower wages and reduced benefits. In mining, for example, the 
response to cost pressures has been to increase outsourcing and subcontracting of 
processes linked to core and non-core mining activities. Labour costs are reduced 
as companies reduce their responsibilities to their workforce. Workers employed 
by contractors are usually not unionized and do not have to be paid wages agreed 
to in centralized bargaining agreements. These workers do not benefit from health 
insurance and pension funds and they are usually not trained by the mining 
company. The pressure for quicker and high returns from shareholders as a result 
of financialization increases the pressure on mining companies to reduce labour 
costs. The announcements by South African gold and platinum companies that 
they were going to drastically reduce employment during 2013 were a response to 
cost and shareholder pressure.  
 
Informalization of work is also a feature of employment in other sectors such as 
business services, retail services, transport services, and footwear and clothing.
13
 
Outsourcing has been a major strategy for South African big business to address 
their changing power relationship with both labour and the state. Services have 
been a major contributor to economic growth in South Africa. The shares of 
finance & business services, trade, catering & accommodation, and transport, 
storage & communication services have all increased over the past fifteen years.  
This predominance of services has been interpreted by some commentators in a 
positive light – as a sign of the maturing of the South African economy and its 
move to a post industrial development phase. It is also noted that services tend to 
be more labour absorbing and thus provide a better answer to the high levels of 
unemployment than an industry oriented development path. But the rise in 
employment in services have been in extremely low wage activities such as 
security and cleaning services, meaning average remuneration has fallen as 
employment has increased (Mohamed and Roberts 2007). They argue that “some 
                                                          
13
 Omar and Webster (2003) examine the responses of management to changes in labour 
markets. They draw their conclusions from sociological studies of workplace and managerial 
changes in the mining industry, footwear manufacturers and call centre operators.  
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of these jobs are a result of the change in classification as such activities are 
outsourced by, for example, manufacturing firms to independent businesses and 
are now classified under services.” (Mohamed and Roberts 2007:9) They argue 
that the increasing role of services in the South African economy is not a sign of 
economic maturation but is due to the withdrawal of capital from the economy 
and the misallocation of capital towards financial speculation, housing price 
booms and luxury consumption instead of productive investment. 
 
Mohamed and Roberts (2007) show that a large proportion of employment in 
South Africa over the past decade has been in business services. The Business 
Services sector includes a very wide and diverse range of activities, from security 
and cleaning to legal and accounting services.  They explain that the increase in 
jobs has been in extremely low wage activities such as security and cleaning 
services, meaning average remuneration has fallen as employment has increased. 
Their main conclusion is that employment created in services are either not in fact 
additional jobs, or are very low wage (and largely insecure) jobs in areas such as 
security services. Similarly Tregenna (2008:33) argues: 
 
The analysis confirms that significant intersectoral outsourcing has taken place 
in South Africa over the last decade. The focus here is on the outsourcing of 
cleaners and security guards, away from manufacturing and from the public 
sector and towards private services. Employment in these two occupations has 
become increasingly concentrated in the ‘other business services’ subsector of 
services in particular, which is where companies that provide services such as 
cleaning and security to firms across the economy are generally classified.  
 
The discussion above of de-industrialization in Europe, particularly Britain during 
the 1980s, is relevant for thinking about the impact of the response of employers 
to both political change in South Africa and global changes associated with 
financialization. South Africa entered the democratic period with high and 
growing levels of unemployment and increasing casualization and outsourcing. 
There was also a shift away from Government repression of labour. The 
relationship between productivity and wages and productivity and skills are 
complex given this particular history. However, the experience in manufacturing 
during the1990s with increased trade liberalization during has mirrored that of 
Britain. Manufacturing declined not because of lower productivity but because of 
lower manufacturing output. The relationship between management and workers 
was tense and the increased power of trade unions and the political changes would 
have increased this tension. The level of productivity would be affected not only 
by the skills of management and workers but also by the relationship and tensions 
between managers and workers. The efforts to decrease employment and to 
outsource and casualise jobs would further increase tensions and negatively affect 
productivity. At the same time, the increased casualisation and outsourcing would 
seem to have a negative impact on productivity in the long run because the 
opportunities for on the job training associated with length of time in a job would 
be reduced as are overall efforts to train workers. 
 
In sum then, there has been deindustrialization, withdrawal from value-added 
sectors and more reliance on mining and minerals sectors. The impact on 
employment has been negative and the changes have led to increasingly 
precarious employment, including in non-productive services. There has been 
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lower productivity as a result not of poor training and skills but because of poor 
pay, casualization and outsourcing, less training and increasing unemployment.  
These factors then interweave with the general allocation of capital across the 
economy under the impact of financialization which reduces long term 
investment. We argue then that the impact of financialization on employment 
levels in South Africa can been seen through a number of distinct but 
interconnected channels (Diagram 5.1). 
 
Insert diagram here 
6 Conclusions 
 
This paper has looked at how the South African economy has become 
increasingly financialized since 1994. We have argued that financialization 
amounts to change in the capitalist accumulation which has shifted the relations 
and processes between households, corporations and financial institutions. 
Financial institutions have become much more important regulators of firm and 
household behaviour, and macroeconomic trajectory as a whole. Financialization 
has affected different countries in specific ways, through the interaction between 
a variety of what we have called different channels of financialization.  
In South Africa’s case, financialization has been situated within the context of the 
changing minerals-energy complex or MEC. Since 1994 major MEC corporations 
have simultaneously internationalized and financialized their operations – though 
as we argued, this has not reduced the overall levels of concentration across the 
economy - and domestic financial markets have become further liberalized. 
Financialization has directed capital away from the long term investment 
necessary to diversify the industrial base. Instead capital has flowed to  
finance and consumption and the sectors with strong linkages to these activities. 
With high levels of capital flight, the economy has become dependent upon short-
term capital inflows to finance the large current account deficit and to maintain 
the overall balance of payments. The financial sector attracts these short-term and 
speculative flows rather than long-term productive capital. Moreover the gap 
between gross savings and gross capital formation has widened since 1994 
because an increasing share of savings has been channelled towards financial 
investment and because of the shifting patterns of investment by non-financial 
corporations. The restructuring of the South African corporate landscape during 
the 1990s has increased South Africa’s dependence on mining and minerals 
resources while strengthening the financial sector but left manufacturing industry 
weakened. We argue that these changes have had strong and negative effects on 
labour and employment. The impact of corporate restructuring and 
financialization on employment has been negative and changes have led to 
increasingly precarious employment.  
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